Erwin Rommel launch an offensive against an Allied defensive line in Tunisia, North Africa

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National WW2 Museum

In November 1942, American and British forces launched Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa through French Morocco and Algeria. This was the first campaign in which the American Army engaged the armed forces of Nazi Germany, commanded under Gen. Erwin Rommel. The Allied forces moved steadily eastward, with the British taking Tripoli under Gen. Bernard Montgomery in late January 1943. Allied forces crossed the Atlas Mountains and took up forward positions at Faid, from which they could thrust eastward towards the Mediterranean Sea, dividing Rommel’s forces in the north and south. But, the American Army was about to encounter the tough realities of what war with the German Army truly meant.

Acting upon the threat, in mid-February Rommel used the Afrika Korps 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions to push back the Allied defensive lines from the Eastern to the Western Dorsale within the interior plain of the Atlas Mountains. The US II Corps concentrated its strength at Tebessa, where Allied commanders Lloyd Fredendall and Kenneth Anderson (UK) believed they could best protect the Kasserine Pass. Rommel, however, sensed the opportunity. With the momentum working against the Allied forces, he realized an attack directly on their main strength through the Kasserine Pass might yield impressive gains — the capture of much needed supplies, protection of the German-held coastal region to the east, and a possible forward staging area for the Luftwaffe to launch further attacks.

In the early morning hours of February 19, the Germans activated their attack through the Kasserine Pass inflicting heavy damage on the Allied forces in the coming days, as the Allies reeled westward in retreat for 50 miles. Underlying problems amongst the Allied forces, and within the American Army in particular, became painfully clear. The Allied forces were not properly positioned because their commanders had not personally reconnoitered the landscape. Not only were the American, British and French forces uncoordinated amongst themselves, but within the American forces Fredendall had split up elements inside divisions, assigning individual tasks on the battlefield rather than emphasizing coordinated, integrated actions. The inexperience of the United States Army in combat was evident in the performance of both troops and equipment. These elements later drew Rommel’s personal scorn. Finally, it was evident that the Allied leadership did not inspire confidence amongst their men.

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http://youtu.be/hsL2GpZYYh0

For more

An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943, Volume One of the Liberation Trilogy
Rick Atkinson

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