M3 Medium Tank Vs Panzer III: Kasserine Pass, 1943

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Focus On: WWII

 

 

M3 Medium Tank Vs Panzer III: Kasserine Pass, 1943

 

By: Gordon L Rottman Date: February14 , 2013

 

 

The night of February 13, 1943, was cold, with the Sidi Bou Zid plain bathed in bright moonlight. General Eisenhower visited the 1st Armored Division CP outside of Sbeïtla over 20 miles northwest of Sidi Bou Zid. He then went on to Sidi Bou Zid, arriving at 0100hrs. Even though warnings had been issued to expect only diversionary attacks from Faïd Pass or the passes to the north and south, it was apparent to the troops that an attack was imminent. Regardless, the troops displayed little motivation, and defensive preparations were poor. German activity had been increasing, and there was a great deal of troop and vehicle movement. It was pointed out that the US infantry defending the high ground were extremely exposed. While they occupied good observation positions, they could be easily cut off and become unable to contribute to the battle on the plain. The 3d Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment in Sidi Bou Zid, reinforced by a dozen halftrack tank destroyers, was down to 40 M4 tanks. A battalion of self-propelled 105mm howitzers and another of towed 155mm howitzers were positioned to the rear. The trains had withdrawn for the night. CCC, serving as a mobile reserve, was located near Hadjeb-el-Aïoun 12 miles north of Djebel Lessouda. Task Force Kern was 40 miles away near Sbeïtla as the division reserve. The Germans were expected to have air superiority, and they had good observation of the area from the higher ground they held to the east. http://www.commandposts.com/2013/02/m3-medium-tank-vs-panzer-iii-kasserine-pass-1943/

[Valin]

Allow me to (highly) recommend An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943, Volume One of the Liberation Trilogy

Rick Atkinson

 

Publishers Weekly

Atkinson won a Pulitzer Prize during his time as a journalist and editor at the Washington Post and is the author of The Long Gray Line: The American Journey of West Point's Class of 1966 and of Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. In contrast to Crusade's illustrations of technomastery, this book depicts the U.S. Army's introduction to modern war. The Tunisian campaign, Atkinson shows, was undertaken by an American army lacking in training and experience alongside a British army whose primary experience had been of defeat. Green units panicked, abandoning wounded and weapons. Clashes between and within the Allies seemed at times to overshadow the battles with the Axis. Atkinson's most telling example is the relationship of II Corps commander George Patton and his subordinate, 1st Armored Division's Orlando Ward. The latter was a decent person and capable enough commander, but he lacked the final spark of ruthlessness that takes a division forward in the face of heavy casualties and high obstacles. With Dwight Eisenhower's approval, Patton fired him. The result was what Josef Goebbels called a "second Stalingrad"; after Tunisia, the tide of war rolled one way: toward Berlin. Atkinson's visceral sympathies lie with Ward; his subtext from earlier books remains unaltered: in war, they send for the hard men. Despite diction that occasionally lapses into the melodramatic, general readers and specialists alike will find worthwhile fare in this intellectually convincing and emotionally compelling narrative.

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Orlando Ward

 

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

Orlando Ward (November 4, 1891 - February 4, 1972) was a career United States Army Officer. During World War II, as a major general, he commanded the U.S. 1st Armored Division during Operation Torch (North Africa). He also served as Secretary to Army Chief of Staff George Marshall in the critical years prior to the war and made major contributions to field artillery procedures in the 1930s that, a decade later, made the American field artillery especially effective in World War II. snip

 

End of the Tunisian campaign

 

After the rout at Kasserine, Patton at first counseled, then admonished Ward of the need for personal leadership of his division in order to keep German forces under pressure.^[7] Impatient with the progress of the 1st Armored, Patton took the unusual step of ordering General Ward to personally lead a night assault on the Meknessy Heights, a series of stubbornly defended knolls in front of the 1st Armored's lines.^[8] Ward obeyed the order, and the attack was initially successful.^[8] Wounded in the eye,^[8] he was awarded a Purple Heart, Silver Star, and later the Distinguished Service Cross. However, the stalemate east of Meknassy continued,^[8] and it appeared to Patton that Ward was still overcautious and too reluctant to incur casualties when conducting offensive operations.^[9] By 1 April 1943 the American offensive that had begun at El Guettar had bogged down against stiffened Axis defenses.^[10] With the concurrence of 18th Army Group commander General Harold Alexander, Patton finally relieved Ward of duty.^[9] Patton's actions were in keeping with Eisenhower's personal written instructions to him after General Fredendall was sacked: "You must not retain for one instant any man in a responsible position where you have become doubtful of his ability to do his job."^[11]

Ward was replaced with General Ernest Harmon, who had successfully intervened to remedy General Fredendall's inaction during the battles of Kasserine Pass. Ward was the only general relieved of his command by Patton during World War II.^[7] Returning to the United States, Ward was briefly Chief of Field Artillery before returning to a combat command late in the war with the U.S. 20th Armored Division operating in Bavaria.

[edit] Postwar career

 

After the war, Ward had two major assignments, first as head of the 6th Infantry Division in Korea (prior to the war there), and later as Chief of Military History, where he oversaw the production of the famous "Green Books," the official U.S. Army military history of World War II. snip

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Focus On: WWII

Feb 20–25, 1944: Big Week Marks the Beginning of the End

By: Bill Yenne | February20, 2013

Tags: Big Week, WWII

Big Week was a watershed moment in World War II, and in the military history of the twentieth century.

It was the point after which nothing would be as it had been before. After a long and difficult gestation, it marked the birth of strategic airpower as a means of effecting the outcome of military action.

 

A year and a half earlier, when British armies achieved their first important ground victory against the Germans in three years of war— at El Alamein—Britain’s wartime prime minister, Winston Churchill, delivered one of his most memorable wartime speeches.

 

“We have a new experience. We have victory—a remarkable and definite victory,” Churchill said. “The Germans have received back again that measure of fire and steel which they have so often meted out to others. Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”

Big Week was the beginning of the end

It was not so much a turning point as it was a tipping point.

http://www.commandpo...ing-of-the-end/

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Focus On: WWII

 

 

Big Week, Berlin and Oil

 

By: John Weal | February20, 2013

Tags: WWII

 

Although the Luftwaffe put elements of 26 Gruppen into the air, its controllers were confused by the multiplicity of targets and were unable to accurately forecast the enemy’s intentions.

 

As a result, relatively few engagements took place before the bombers reached their objectives, and even after the American formations had turned for home, the fighter attacks delivered by the Luftwaffe lacked coordination.

 

Only 21 heavy bombers failed to return. This was just two more than the number claimed by the four Focke-Wulf Gruppen involved in the day’s action (although a further 30 claims were submitted by other units!). http://www.commandposts.com/2013/02/big-week-berlin-and-oil/