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Bruce Hoffman: What Osama Was Thinking at the End


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Bin Laden was more fearful that his men might be affected by the weather than by any effort of the Pakistani government to apprehend them.

BRUCE HOFFMAN

5/8/12

 

By releasing 17 documents seized last year from Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, the U.S. government has supplied a needed corrective to the bunkum that has passed for analysis throughout the war on terrorism's first decade. For too long, government officials and pundits alike have made extravagant and incorrect claims about the weakness of al Qaeda and the irrelevance of its founding leader.

 

Americans were repeatedly told that al Qaeda had ceased to exist as an organizational entity, that it had become nothing more than a hollow shell, a leaderless group of disparate individuals unconnected to any central authority. Bin Laden was said to be completely estranged from the movement he created: living in a remote cave, isolated from his fighters, sympathizers and supporters, unable to exercise any meaningful role in the movement's operations and future trajectory.

 

(Snip)

 

Given the severe limitations imposed on bin Laden by the U.S. intelligence and military operations, it is striking how far his movement has been able to expand beyond South Asia. The documents indisputably depict an al Qaeda that in 2011 had an active presence in more places than it did on Sept. 11, 2001. Bin Laden himself is seen as struggling to control this now geographically far-flung organization, determined to try to shape events in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia and Iraq, among other places.

 

That he may have been "out of sync" or had fraught relations with the affiliates is therefore not surprising. This was the trade-off he accepted after 2001 to ensure the movement's survival by devolving power to the local franchises. Nonetheless, he remained both determined and able to communicate his wishes to al Qaeda's growing stable of associates. Getting them to listen was of course a problem familiar to any manager coping with rapid expansion.

 

(Snip)

 

(Note: Bruce asks some very interesting questions at the end of this column)

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