Stratfor.com Intelligence Guidance: The Situation in Egypt

[Casino67]

BillOreilly.com:

February 2, 2011
Editor's Note: The following is an internal STRATFOR document produced to provide high-level guidance to our analysts. This document is not a forecast, but rather a series of guidelines for understanding and evaluating events, as well as suggestions on areas for focus.

Let's use the Iranian rising of 1979 as a model. It had many elements involved, from Communists, to liberals to moderate Muslims, and of course the radicals. All of them were united in hating the Shah, but not in anything else.

The Western press did not understand the mixture and had its closest ties with the liberals, for the simple reason that they were the most Western and spoke English. For a very long time they thought these liberals were in control of the revolution.

For its part, the intelligence community did not have good sources among the revolutionaries but relied on SAVAK, the Shah's security service, for intelligence. SAVAK neither understood what was happening, nor was it prepared to tell the CIA. The CIA suspected the major agent was the small Communist Party, because that was the great fear at that time—namely, that the Soviets were engineering a plot to seize Iran and control the Persian Gulf.

Meanwhile, Western human rights groups painted the Shah as a monster and saw this as a popular democratic rising. Western human rights and democracy groups, funded by the U.S. government and others, were standing by to teach people like Bani Sadr to create a representative democracy.

[pollyannaish]

This is a good perspective. It goes to show where other things I've heard could be misleading.

 

AND, is a good example of how we don't know what we don't know.