The Surge is Working — So Far

[Valin]

Standpoint:

ANTHONY LOYD
December 2010

It was a bright and beautiful September dawn. The promise of imminent action made it finer still, keying the senses until they thrilled at the web of rose light cast by the rising sun across the vines and marijuana fields of Zhari district. Catching the rotor tips of the circling Kiowa helicopters in autumnal glow, as the sun broke free from the horizon line, the colours changed again and the world was momentarily cloaked in gold. If only war were always this way.
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The struggle for the district is something of a microcosm for the surge. With an inhabited area little more than 30 kilometres wide and perhaps eight km deep, squeezed between the Arghandab River to the south and Highway 1 to the north, Zhari's position abutting this crucial communication route to Kandahar had given it disproportionate significance as a staging post for the Taliban.

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Forever ingrained into my brain was the image of a US soldier fighting in the flat light of late morning, his combat trousers ripped open through wear along the seams of his crotch from knee to knee, his penis out and flapping ridiculously, firing up the vineyards with his M4 carbine while beside him lolled an ANA trooper so stoned he struggled to keep his eyes open, his helmet strap hooked under his nose, weapon cradled uselessly in his arms, an utterly moronic figure: not quite the official pin-up boys of the surge, but certainly memorable.

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[Valin]

More

 

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The metrics in measuring success in any counter-insurgency are murky and imprecise. Given the seasonal variations in Afghanistan's war, whereby winter and poppy harvest are traditional low points in enemy activity, short-term interpretation becomes even less reliable. Days short of leaving Afghanistan, General Carter, the architect of so much of the surge operation in the south, spoke only of "encouraging signs" rather than "winning", and warned against judging the effect of the surge until next summer when the new fighting season arrives. "They are by no means huge measures of success," he cautioned at the end of October, describing an increase of local intelligence given to Nato by Afghans and an improvement in the security along Highway 1 and other roads, where Taliban attacks decreased by up to 80 percent as the surge intensified. "But you can see the general direction of travel."

 

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While insisting that most of the Taliban in Zhari were locals, he also suggested that few had ideological conviction beyond a desire to fight foreign troops, a paradigm threatening the surge's logic. But unlike during the jihad against the Russians when locals were united behind the resistance, he added today Zhari's population was split over the legitimacy of the insurgents' struggle. "It's not seen as such a good fight," Haji Rahmatulah continued. "But at the end it isn't down to Mullah Omar. It's down to Pakistan, America and Britain. If the right pressure is put on Pakistan, the Taliban would accept just three ministries, and the constitution, to end all of this. Without that pressure you can build 100 roads in Zhari and fight for a thousand years and you will still have Taliban in the orchards."

 

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Moreover, the one Maginot Line-sized flaw in the surge strategy which would have ensured victory for the Taliban's patience — Obama's stated intention to start withdrawing US forces from Afghanistan in the summer of 2011 — appears to be fading. The picture has changed. Obama's timetables are under question and the 2011 withdrawal is in doubt. A limited scaling back of some US support troops next summer seems inevitable. But the combat forces set to replace this year's surge troops in Kandahar are already in training in America and due to come to Afghanistan next summer, transforming the supposed US withdrawal into something of a wooden horse that may instead haunt the Taliban. The insurgents have invested so much hope in the panacea of "2011" that as 2014 emerges as a more realistic date for significant US scaledown, it may be the Taliban, not the Americans, who become exhausted and find themselves battered to the negotiating table.

 

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[Rokke]

"We see an organisation [the Taliban] that looks like any other army in reverse," said an official privy to intercepts. "They say that their higher headquarters don't get it, that they haven't got the people, they haven't got the equipment. No ammunition. No detonators. Suicide bombers failing to show up. Locals no longer agreeing to bury their dead or help the wounded to aid stations. Their leadership and logistical train has broken apart. The organisation is so chopped that we're seeing mailroom guys trying to run the corporation."

 

It's always hard to know if statements like the above are wishful thinking or long term reality. The MSM is mostly quiet regarding Afghanistan (compared to their full out barrage anytime there was potentially bad news in Iraq). The battlefields are completely different so Patreous has had to develop an entirely different strategy. Can he hit the bullseye twice in a row? If so, put him in the Whitehouse asap.

[Valin]

"We see an organisation [the Taliban] that looks like any other army in reverse," said an official privy to intercepts. "They say that their higher headquarters don't get it, that they haven't got the people, they haven't got the equipment. No ammunition. No detonators. Suicide bombers failing to show up. Locals no longer agreeing to bury their dead or help the wounded to aid stations. Their leadership and logistical train has broken apart. The organisation is so chopped that we're seeing mailroom guys trying to run the corporation."

 

It's always hard to know if statements like the above are wishful thinking or long term reality. The MSM is mostly quiet regarding Afghanistan (compared to their full out barrage anytime there was potentially bad news in Iraq). The battlefields are completely different so Patreous has had to develop an entirely different strategy. Can he hit the bullseye twice in a row? If so, put him in the Whitehouse asap.

 

 

I always take these sort of statements with a grain of salt. Remember they are going to put a positiver spin on tings...not that we are not winning, but.....know what I mean.

 

 

Yes the battle space is different from Iraq, but the underlying principals of COIN remain the same.