Reassessing the Surge: Bold Shift or Strategic Disconnect?

[Valin]

War On The Rocks:

Frank Hoffman

December 4, 2013

 

The topic of Dr. Peter Mansoors new book has generated endless debate about what some call our endless war. Many will approach the subject with skepticism. The escalation of American commitment in Iraq in 2007, the period covered by Surge, remains controversial to this day. There is evidence that this escalation was manifestly successful in dampening the internecine mayhem that nearly consumed Iraq in 2007. Determinations of how successful the extended surge was at the strategic level of war remains colored by ongoing violence in Baghdad, Mosul, Baquba, Kirkuk and elsewhere. A definitive answer will be elusive for some time.

 

While history has not yet rendered a verdict, this new book will give it a strong push. The author brings a unique perspective to the task. Dr. Mansoor served two tours in Iraq, the latter as the Executive Assistant to General David Petraeus. He is an established Army combat veteran, a former Brigade commander in Iraq, and a serious soldier-scholar. He received a PhD from Ohio State University where he now holds a chair of military history. His last book, * Baghdad at Sunrise, was chocked full of deep personal views on the war in Iraq. My review described that book as an exceptional memoir that decades from now will still be ranked as an insightful but especially candid history of the war. Five years later, that assessment still stands. This sequel will extend the authors reputation due to its nuanced grasp of Iraqs complexities.

 

This reviewer comes to the surge debate as a deep skeptic. The Iraq Study Group argued for a withdrawal from Iraq, and this recommendation made sense after three years of occupation. The argument for 30,000 additional forces appeared to overlook opportunity costs and the state of our ground forces at the time. Surge proponents in Washington offered tactical uses for more forces, but no overarching strategy or political component. Some Beltway advocates promoted the surge: merely to provide the Bush Administration with a last we gave it our best shot conclusion. The notion of rushing several partially trained Brigade Combat Teams or extending a few exhausted Marine Battalions in theater appeared to have little merit. The lack of follow-on forces for a sustained effort compounded the problem. What would six more months achieve that the last three years had not? The strategic golden hour had seemingly passed.

 

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* Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq

While not a Must Read but a Should Read for those interested in the Iraq war.