Nukes for NATO

[ErnstBlofeld]

Air Force Magazine:

 

For more than 60 years, nuclear-armed fighters have been a key part of the US deterrence calculus, particularly in Europe. Indeed, providing the umbrella of "extended deterrence" to NATO nations has been a mission performed by generations of USAF air crews, maintainers, and security forces.

 

It now appears that, before long, the iconic nuclear fighter role, performed in recent years by the F-15E and F-16, will pass to a new heavyweight—the F-35 Lightning II.

 

As the Obama Administration sees it, nuclear weapons delivered by fighters will continue to play an important role in the nation’s international affairs. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, released in April, reaffirmed the requirement for tactical nuclear weapons in US defense strategy.

 

The United States, it said, will "retain the capability to forward deploy US nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers ... and proceed with full scope life extension for the B61 bomb, including enhancing safety, security, and use control."

The Air Force, the NPR made clear, will "retain a dual-capable fighter ... as it replaces F-16s with the F-35." The NPR also announced final retirement of the nuclear-capable Tomahawk cruise missile (TLAM-N), a theater-range nuke. The Army long ago eliminated its theater nuclear missiles. Thus, USAF will do all of Washington’s heavy lifting for extended tactical deterrence.

 

Several NATO countries have the technical capability to deliver US nuclear warheads with nuclear-certified fighters. Each munitions storage site—some were completed as recently as 1998—can securely house a score or more of warheads in NATO’s central and southern regions.

 

NATO members Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway formally requested that the alliance discuss potential withdrawal of US weapons from the continent as the alliance reviews its strategic concept. Other nations, including several formerly under Soviet domination, disagree. They say such weapons are critical symbols of the US military commitment to Europe.

 

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton rebuffed the call. "First," she said, "we should recognize that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance."

 

In short, the policy of extended deterrence is alive and well, but meeting the NPR’s guidance over the long run will hinge on success with the F-35 and the B61 bomb refurbishment.

 

The Air Force has a long and successful track record with extended deterrence. In fact, fighters carrying tactical nuclear weapons have been around nearly as long as NATO itself.

In the late 1940s, war plans for a confrontation with the Soviet Union in Europe first depended on B-36 intercontinental bombers attacking Soviet targets. But planners conceded that the strategic bombing would not prevent the battle-hardened Red Army from trampling much of Europe if Stalin chose to invade. With Europe demobilized, atomic weapons were seen as vital to the ground force engagement.

 

A new forward defense war plan code-named Ironbark incorporated a limited form of tactical atomic weaponry for NATO from 1950 onward. At first, when plans anticipated that much of Europe would be overrun, it was mainly a mission for Navy attack aircraft. Up to 16 aircraft carriers on NATO’s flanks would use nuclear weapons against invading Soviet forces.

 

In February 1951, the US Sixth Fleet, operating on permanent assignment in the Mediterranean, received AJ-1 Savage attack aircraft capable of carrying atomic bombs from the fleet’s aircraft carriers. "We certainly need their atomic capabilities," declared five-star Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was NATO’s first Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

 

Meanwhile, Tactical Air Command was training the first cadre of F-84 pilots for nuclear alert in Europe. When atomic artillery in the form of the 280 mm howitzer arrived in Europe in the fall of 1952, Eisenhower’s staff put the guns in their plans.

 

As a NATO strategy paper recounted: "To deter major war in Europe, nuclear weapons were integrated into the whole of NATO’s force structure, and the alliance maintained a variety of targeting plans which could be executed at short notice."

 

Just Across the Border

 

The result was a mission known as Victor Alert. Fine-tuned command and control of NATO’s extensive arsenal required continuous practice and exercises. Officers at US Air Forces in Europe became experts in the high-stakes task of moving nuclear weapons to aircraft to arm and get them airborne under tight time lines.

 

A 1987 list compiled by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists identified nearly a dozen aircraft types certified to drop nuclear bombs, not including strategic bombers. The F-100 pulled the mission for years. The F-104G Starfighter was nuclear-certified for the air forces of Italy, Greece, and Turkey

For USAF, the main aircraft for nuclear operations were the F-4, F-111, F-16, and much later, the F-15E. The F-111 wings in England in the 1970s were tasked to quickly launch up to 60 aircraft under certain war plans. F-111s could carry multiple B61 warheads.

 

During the 1980s, F-16s in "triple doc" squadrons—those tasked with air-to-air, air-to-ground, and nuclear missions—sat Victor Alert at bases in Europe. Under NATO’s quick-response mandates, two aircraft from each squadron in a wing of three squadrons might be on alert, with B61s loaded, at all times. The aircrews had to demonstrate they could take off within 15 minutes of an alert order.

 

NATO discontinued the rapid alerts as the Cold War receded. The alert culture once inculcated in thousands of Air Force officers and enlisted members went with it. Today’s dual-capable fighters still train to the mission, but on a scale anticipating a slower buildup of readiness over a period of weeks.

 

Part of the reason that nuclear fighters remain in NATO is because Russia still has thousands of nonstrategic nuclear warheads. For many of the new NATO members, that’s still just across the border.

 

The Air Force’s forward deployed presence "is a response to the volume of nonstrategic nuclear weapons Russia has in its arsenal," said Maj. Gen. C. Donald Alston, assistant chief of staff for nuclear matters at Air Force headquarters.

 

Thus, the US remains firmly committed to extended deterrence. Maintaining its credibility depends on the stockpile, dual-capable aircraft, and crews trained to deliver nukes.

 

According to Amy F. Woolf of the Congressional Research Service, the US in 2010 keeps in Europe only "a few hundred" nuclear weapons for fighters. As to platforms, the burden for USAF falls on its F-16s and, in recent years, the F-15Es. They, however, are getting old.

 

It was a foregone conclusion that the F-35 would inherit the extended deterrence mantle. Early in the program, some questioned whether such nuclear capability was truly needed, but Pentagon officials held firm on that requirement.

 

Actually, most of the aircraft the F-35 is designed to replace had nuclear missions. For the Navy, the dual-capable antecedents lay in certified aircraft such as the A-6 and A-7, plus the F/A-18. The Marine Corps AV-8B was also nuclear certified.

For the British, in addition to the Harrier, there was the nuclear-certified Panavia Tornado GR1 with a low-level interdiction role. Britain armed its Tornados with the WE177, a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon ultimately retired from RAF service in 1998. (Though the WE177s were dismantled, Britain retains D5 warheads for the Trident missile in its submarine fleet.)

 

NATO members Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy did not develop indigenous nuclear weapons programs. Instead, they maintained dual-certified aircraft capable of uploading US B61s during a crisis.

 

Given this background, the requirement for nuclear weapons certification for F-35 was planned from the beginning.

 

[ErnstBlofeld]

 

This photo was taken by the United States Air Force. It is a B61 nuclear weapon(nominal yield of 300-340 kilotons) in its protective elevated vault.These weapons are usually stored in NATO bases in Europe. This vault can hold four B61 bombs securely.Only selected Air Force personnel have the Permissive Action Link codes to partly fuze the warhead.