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START challenged in secret briefing on 'whether Treaty is verifiable'


ErnstBlofeld

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ErnstBlofeld

www.geostrategy-direct.comGeo Strategy Direct:

 

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a top-secret briefing last week on the U.S. intelligence community’s National Intelligence Estimate on the new START arms treaty and whether it can be verified.

The central witness in the hearing was Rose Gottemoeller, assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance. Details of the briefing and the NIE have not been disclosed, but comments by officials and other specialists have revealed major problems with the treaty’s verification provisions.

 

Russia has been shown to cheat on past arms treaties in a systematic way and is also involved in strategic deception and disinformation programs designed to fool outside observers about its strategic arms.

 

 

 

New START negotiators Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation and Ambassador Anatoly Antonov of the Russian Federation at the U.S. embassy in Rome in April 2009. Reuters

 

Sen. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz. and one of the treaty’s main critics told the Wall Street Journal July 8 that “it’s not clear that the treaty’s verification provisions are adequate.”

 

Gottemoeller, a key START negotiator, has said that while all on-site inspections under previous strategic arms treaties ended in December with the expiration of the 1991 START agreement, she believes the new treaty can be verified. Gottemoeller said the verification provisions were based on the idea that “we are no longer in a Cold War relationship.”

 

Gottemoeller said the verification provisions include notifications, data exchanges, agreed conversion and elimination procedures, inspections, demonstrations, and exhibitions. It will also include the use of “identifiers” for ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, along with warhead on-site inspections.

 

However, critics of the START treaty say that numerous annual State Department reports on arms control compliance, many of which have not been released, show Russian noncompliance through the 2000s.

 

Former State Department arms control official Robert Joseph testified last month that he questions whether the new treaty will meet the past standard introduced during the Reagan administration and known as “trust but verify” arms agreements with Moscow.

 

“Whether the New START Treaty meets this standard is a major issue,” Joseph said, noting that the NIE had not been completed at the time of his testimony.

 

“Experience suggests that there will substantial conditionality in the IC’s judgments. The level of confidence in the assessments will differ depending on the assumptions. As just one example, if Russia does what the IC expects in terms of road-mobile ICBM deployments, the confidence level will be higher than the level if Russia practices denial and deception techniques that are not prohibited by the Treaty. As with previous assessments from the IC and State, the devil will be in the details."

 

While noting data exchanges and on-site inspections are part of the verification regime, Joseph said “the treaty leaves potentially significant gaps in our ability to monitor developments in Russia’s strategic posture.”

 

“For example, the end of the U.S. on-the-ground presence at Votkinsk means we will have less confidence than under START I in our ability to determine what is exiting this Russian missile manufacturing facility,” he said. “Moreover, given the telemetry exchange provisions, whereby each side determines the information to be shared, we may have additional gaps in understanding ongoing and future Russian strategic force improvements.”

 

“The Obama Administration argues that this change in monitoring posture will not affect the ability to verify New START limits because these limits are different than under START I,” he said. “While perhaps technically true, New START is being advertised as a means of strengthening predictability. Yet, because of changes in the telemetry regime, we will have less transparency into Russia’s modernization. This is likely to undermine confidence and predictability.”

 

Joseph noted that the question senators need to answer before ratifying the treaty is not whether the country will be better off with the monitoring provisions of the new treaty than without them. “The question is whether the Treaty is verifiable. The answer is unclear at this time. Before rendering judgment on the Treaty, we must await assurances of the ability to verify its provisions.”

 

 

 

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