American Jihad, Part II

[Valin]

The National Interest:

Bruce Hoffman
7/22/10

Several disquieting trends converged in New York City’s fabled Times Square entertainment district last May. First, a foreign terrorist group, with a hitherto local agenda and otherwise parochial aims, once again is believed to have stretched its wings and sought to operate on a broader, more ambitious global canvas. Second, the conventional wisdom, which long held that the threat to the United States was primarily external and involved foreigners coming from overseas to kill Americans in this country again has been shattered. Third, the comforting stereotype that terrorists are poor, uneducated, provincial loners—and thus are both different from us and can be readily identified—has once more been compromised. And, finally, that the American “melting pot”—our historical capacity to readily absorb new immigrants—would provide something of a “fire wall” against radicalization and recruitment has now fallen by the wayside. The Times Square incident, despite initial claims to the contrary, was not a “one-off” event perpetrated by an individual variously described as “isolated” or a “lone wolf” but is rather part of an emerging pattern of terrorism that directly threatens the United States and presents new and formidable challenges to our national security.

(Snip)

On our response. Who in fact is responsible in the U.S. government for identifying radicalization when it is occurring and then interdicting attempts at recruitment? Is this best done by federal law enforcement (e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation) or state and local jurisdictions working closely with federal authorities? Is it a core mission for a modernized, post-9/11 FBI? Or an additional mission for the Department of Homeland Security? Can it be done instead by the National Counterterrorism Center, even though it has only a coordinating function and relies on other agencies for intelligence collection, analysis and operations? What is the role of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in homegrown terrorism, recruitment and radicalization? Will coming to grips with these challenges be the remit of the next FBI director given the incumbent’s impending retirement?

On our current national-security architecture. Despite the reforms adopted from the 9/11 Commission’s report and recommendations, and the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, have terrorists nonetheless discovered our Achilles’ heel in that we currently have no strategy to counter the threat of homegrown terrorists and other radicalized recruits? Did “the system really work,” as we are repeatedly told? Or was a lot of luck involved because of the Times Square plot’s rushed nature? And finally, can we deter al-Qaeda and its affiliates and associates from attacking in the United States? If even a “hard target” like New York City continually attracts terrorist attention, what does this tell us about vulnerabilities elsewhere in the country?

(Snip)



American Jihad Part I