Operation Eagle Claw Fails 4/24/80

[Valin]

Operation Eagle Claw: The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission

Charles Tustin Kamps

21 September 2006

 

In military history one can stand out as a splendid example or a disastrous reminder. The brave men who attempted to rescue American hostages in Iran in April of 1980 unfortunately became a disastrous reminder of the need for unity of command, joint training, and good communications, and the dangers of overly complex and needlessly compartmented planning. The failure of their mission, Operation Eagle Claw, would be a prime motivator in the subsequent formation of US Special Operations Command.

 

(Snip)

 

Major General James B. Vaught (US Army) was appointed Joint Task Force commander, and a team of officers was assembled to lead the various components, including: Colonel Charles A. Beckwith (founder of the Armys new Delta Force counter-terrorist group) to be the ground assault commander; Colonel James H. Kyle (long-time USAF MC-130 special operator) to command the fixed wing contingent; and Marine Lieutenant Colonel Edward Seiffert (an experienced night-vision flyer) to lead the helicopter force. From the beginning the idea that all the services should have a piece of the action plagued the operation and led to bad decisions. This was the first major mistake.

 

Planning

 

In the realm of military planning there are plans that might work and plans that wont work. In the cold light of history it is evident that the plan for Eagle Claw was in the second category, but since the planning process was deliberately kept compartmented and secretive, no outside group could review the finished plan for a reality check. This was the second major mistake.

 

(Snip)

 

Training

 

If planning was complex and compartmented, so was training. In order to make up for deficiencies in the chosen equipment, e.g., the helicopters, refueling on the ground at night had to be practiced in desert terrain. Marine pilots, who ended up flying almost all of the helicopters, had little experience in long distance flying over land with night vision goggles. They were not special operations personnel, and had no experience with sand storm conditions.

 

omponent training was mainly carried out in widely separated locations: Hurlburt Field, Florida for the Air Force; Yuma, Arizona and Twenty-nine Palms, California for the Marines; and Fort Bragg, North Carolina for Delta Force. Rarely did participants see members from other services, and there was no full up dress rehearsal. In fact, problems which surfaced during training tended to reappear during the actual mission. However, crewmen seemed satisfied that their individual parts in the operation would work as expected, and they were confident of success.

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________________________

 

I recall waking up hearing about this and saying..."Can't We Do Anything Right Anymore?"