The Measure of a Superpower: A Two Major Regional Contingency Military for the 21st Century

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Heritage.org

3/8/13

 

How much military force does a global superpower require? Answering this question has challenged U.S. leaders and defense planners for more than 20 years. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States found itself the world’s sole superpower, but one without a significant adversary against which to measure the adequacy of its military capabilities. Building a force capable of fighting two major wars at the same time means increasing the size of the U.S. military, modernizing existing platforms and systems, and investing in advanced air, sea, and land capabilities. Join us as Dr. Daniel Goure discusses his arguments for why the U.S. must continue to be able to fight two major conflicts simultaneously in order to sustain prosperity and security.

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The Measure of a Superpower: A Two Major Regional Contingency Military for the 21st Century

By Daniel Goure, Ph.D.

January 25, 2013

 

 

How much military force does a global superpower require? Answering this question has challenged U.S. leaders and defense planners for more than 20 years. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States found itself the world’s sole superpower, but one without a significant adversary against which to measure the adequacy of its military capabilities. In the immediate aftermath of the first Gulf War, U.S. leaders decided to use the requirement to conduct two major regional conventional contingencies (MRCs) at the same time as the basis for sizing the U.S. military. Every subsequent review of U.S. defense policy and programs has reaffirmed the two-war standard. In fact, every Administration for the past two decades found that a force sized to fight two wars was essential for meeting the ongoing demands for forward presence, crisis response, regional deterrence, humanitarian assistance, building partnership capacity, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities

 

Based on some 20 years of analyses and studies as well as the experiences of Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom, a two-MRC force should generally consist of 10 Active and eight Reserve Component Army divisions, two to three Marine Expeditionary Forces, 11 aircraft carriers, 120 large surface naval combatants, 38 large amphibious warfare ships, 200 strategic bombers, 20 tactical fighter wings, 400–500 tankers, and 250 airlifters. Such a force would need support from a wide range of enabling capabilities, such as special operations forces; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; cyber defenses; air and missile defenses; and space systems.

 

Today’s military is too small to meet the two-MRC test credibly. Moreover, the qualitative advantage that the U.S. military has long enjoyed is eroding as advanced military capabilities proliferate around the world. The capabilities of U.S. forces are also deteriorating as platforms and systems age and as critical modernization programs are delayed or even cancelled.

 

Building a two-MRC force for the 21st century means increasing the size of the U.S. military, modernizing existing platforms and systems, and investing in advanced air, sea, and land capabilities. This will require resources above the levels proposed by the Obama Administration. Over the next decade, building a reasonable two-MRC force for the 21st century will cost roughly $70 billion more per year than the projected cost of the current defense program, which averages approximately $550 billion per year.

 

Section I: What It Takes to Be a Military Superpower

 

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On A Related Note.....(Click On Link For Vid)

 

Taking the long view: Strategies for peacetime competition with China

About This Event

 

Event Summary

 

Although the US has enormous opportunities for cooperation with China, the two countries are already in a long-term competition, emphasized Representative J. Randy Forbes and a panel of experts at an AEI event on Tuesday. After describing US and Chinese strengths and vulnerabilities, Forbes laid out some policy prescriptions for peacetime competition, including strengthening relationships with old allies and new partners, helping India become a strong land power, and taking steps to reduce the effectiveness of threatening Chinese military capabilities. The congressman likewise pushed back against budget cutting in Washington, calling for a revitalization of the US Navy.

 

Following Forbes's remarks, the Naval War College's Thomas G. Mahnken explained how the nature of China's rise, growing economic constraints on the exercise of American power, and responses from within Asia to Chinese assertiveness necessitate the adoption of a new US strategy for China. Jim Thomas of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, however, highlighted that the Pentagon bureaucracy is not optimized for designing long-term peacetime strategies.

 

Toshi Yoshihara, also of the Naval War College, discussed the role that Japan — as a key US ally — could play in the competition, noting that the island nation has geographic and military advantages that should allow it to exploit Chinese vulnerabilities. According to AEI's Dan Blumenthal, those vulnerabilities include a fragile geographic position, dependence on imports, and a weakening internal political system.

 

--Michael Mazza

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Why these Pentagon cuts must be different

Charles Morrison

March 19, 2013

 

Despite over 18 months of assurances that sequestration was too devastating to go into effect, the Pentagon is now implementing nearly $500 billion in cuts over the next nine years — on top of nearly $1 trillion in defense cuts enacted since the Obama administration came into office. In the midst of such a large drawdown, how can the Pentagon leadership cut more intelligently in order to avoid the hollow force the Chiefs call unacceptable?

 

Up until this point, the Pentagon has been meeting reduced budget targets by diminishing its strategic goals, reducing readiness, and delaying needed modernization initiatives. Now the Pentagon is gearing up to produce yet another strategic review to determine whether the goals of its most recent guidance — barely one year old — are still tenable given shrinking resources.

 

There is a smarter way to manage the current defense drawdown. At an AEI panel on Thursday morning, AEI will host a discussion about why this defense drawdown must be different for the Pentagon. The panel will feature Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Clark Murdock of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Gordon Adams of the Stimson Center, and Major General (Ret.) Arnold Punaro.